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Pedagogically Reclaiming Marx’s Politics in The Postdigital Age: Social formations and
Althuserrian pedagogical gestures
Abstract
This paper builds on marxist postdigital literature by first by clarifying what a ‘mode of
production’ is, what the capitalist mode of production is, and how, why, and on what technological
foundations it emerged. This leads into a discussion of these technological foundations and their
relationship to production, knowledge, research, and subjectivity; in other words, the ‘general
intellect’. At this point I move from discussing modes of production to social formations or socioeconomic formations, and I show why social formations are more helpful to conceptualize the
political and pedagogical struggle in the era of postdigital capitalism (and any capitalism) as well
as to insist on the division between capitalism and communism, two distinct modes of production
in between which socialism is posited as a transitional social formation. With the postdigital age,
collaboration, networked interactions, communication, open-source platforms, and more might be
elements of a future mode of production. I end by returning to the question of the marxist political
project and propose a postdigital marxist pedagogical approach that might help educators shift the
balance of forces in the class struggle based on Althusser’s reading of Capital that brings together
two formerly opposed educational forms: counterinterpellation and disinterpellation.
Keywords: Marx, postdigital, general intellect, pedagogy, class struggle, Althusser, mode of
production, law of value
Introduction
While postdigital research that incorporates marxism continues to grow, much of this research
relies primarily on contemporary marxist theorists, from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000,
2017) to Jodi Dean (2009, 2015), Nick Dyer-Withford (2015) and Christian Fuchs (2019), who
write in the postdigital age. With a few exceptions (e.g., Malott 2019; Rikowski and Ford 2019)—
the postdigital science and educational community hasn’t deeply engaged in Marx’s own writings
or the writings of marxists that followed him but preceded the digital or postdigital age. Missed
here is an opportunity for postdigital scholars to return to these analog works and see how they
can inform our struggles in the postdigital era today. Doing so is helpful for clarifying the extent
to which contemporary, postdigital marxist1 and marxist-adjacent research extends or diverges
from Marx’s own works and, more importantly, the political project.
We all know that Marx believes philosophers shouldn’t just interpret but change the world,
but many forget, repress, or bypass (for various material and theoretical reasons) the direction
toward which he wanted to change it, which was inextricably linked with what he studied and
wrote—with marxist theory, in other words. Marx made this most explicit in a famous 1852 letter
to Joseph Weydemeyer, a comrade who emigrated from Germany to the U.S. and fought in the
Union Army against slavery. In the letter, Marx wrote that bourgeois theorists before him had
discovered the existence of classes and the class struggle, but that what he proved was that the
class struggle can lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that the ‘dictatorship [of the
proletariat] itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless
I don’t capitalize ‘marxist’ in order to emphasize that marxism has less to do with Marx himself and more to do
with the struggles of workers and the oppressed.
1

society’ (1983: 62-65). In 1852 he hadn’t, of course, discovered the motor of this struggle—
surplus-value—but the project was consistent throughout his life. It’s a project, however, that
today too many—including but not limited to marxist academics—have abandoned.
As such, it’s crucial to begin with a lesson that Louis Althusser learned from Lenin, that ‘a
“practice” of philosophy, and the consciousness of what practising philosophy’ entails ‘the
consciousness of the ruthless, primary fact that philosophy divides’ (2001: 13). The marxist
tradition that orders practice above theory is often misunderstood because in marxism there is no
harsh binary between the two—such a binary is idealist. Instead, marxist philosophy must begin
from everyday practices of production and reproduction, or struggle and defeat, move to
abstraction, and then return to the real concrete with new thoughts that are hopefully more correct,
which means they will advance the class struggle.
One of our contemporary marxist theorists and organizers recently published an excellent
paper on ‘Capitalism, Crisis, and Educational Struggle in the Postdigital.’ Curry Malott, an
associate professor in the US, organizer with the ANSWER Coalition, and member of the Party
for Socialism and Liberation. One of a growing number of communist educational scholars, Malott
shows that the postdigital is, as so many definitions put it, difficult to pin down. The reason is that
the postdigital is a dialectical process; it’s ‘something real, something in perpetual motion,
something in the process of development, and something sublated’ (2019: 372). The postdigital is
the sublation of the analogue under the digital, as the former continues to exist but in a reconfigured
form or, more precisely, in a constantly reshaping form. The struggle, as Malott formulates it, is
over what form the postdigital will take, which will be determined by what mode of production
prevails.
This struggle is what the present paper builds on, and it does so first by clarifying what a
‘mode of production’ is, what the capitalist mode of production is, and how, why, and on what
technological foundations it emerged. This leads into a discussion of these technological
foundations and their relationship to production, knowledge, research, and subjectivity; in other
words, the ‘general intellect’. This term is familiar to many and is the focus of several
contemporary marxist theorists (e.g., Virno 2004; Hardt and Negri 2017) and marxist educational
theorists (e.g., de Lissovoy and Armonda 2020; Ford 2020a, b; Lewis 2012; Means 2018; Peters
2020). I spend time relating Marx’s presentation of machinery in Capital to that of the general
intellect in the Grundrisse (e.g., Ford and Jandrić 2021) emphasizing the two contradictions at play
in each, before interjecting that these contradictions are only useful insofar as the workers’ struggle
takes them up to shift the balance of forces in the class struggle for a new mode of production.
At this point I move from discussing modes of production to social formations or socioeconomic formations, and I show why social formations are more helpful to conceptualize the
political and pedagogical struggle in the era of postdigital capitalism (and any capitalism) as well
as to insist on the division between capitalism and communism, two distinct modes of production
in between which socialism is posited as a transitional social formation. Multiple modes of
production co-exist in any social formation, and the project is to locate possible elements of the
communist mode of production in the capitalist one, a project Marx pursued and one I begin
pursuing in our postdigital age. With the postdigital age, collaboration, networked interactions,
communication, open-source platforms, and more might be elements of a future mode of
production. I argue by way of a commentary on the immeasurable and the law of value that they
are, at present, primary motors for capitalist accumulation. Finally, I return to the question of the
marxist political project and propose a postdigital marxist pedagogical approach, one that might
help educators shift the balance of forces in the class struggle. Such an approach is based on

Althusser’s reading of Capital that brings together two formerly opposed educational forms:
counterinterpellation and disinterpellation.
What Is A Mode of Production?
Interestingly, in the index of International Publishers edition of the first volume of Marx’s
Capital—the edition and translation prepared and approved by Progress Publishers, one of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s publishing houses—there are no pages dedicated to the
entry ‘mode of production’. This affirms what Althusser tells us, that Marx ‘never provided a true,
concise, well thought-out definition of the mode of production’ (2020: 67). Marx instead offered
two definitions.
In the chapter on the labor process, Marx will tell us how to distinguish between the
different modes: ‘It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments.’
(1867/1967: 175) In this definition, a mode of production is a way of producing articles of utility
and is determined by the means of production. Yet later, Marx writes that production on an
expanded scale ‘does not present itself as accumulation of capital, nor as the function of a capitalist,
so long as the labourer’s means of production, and with them, his product and means of
subsistence, do not confront him int eh shape of capital’ (560). Here the mode of production refers
to ‘the way producing in the social sense’, which is ‘the whole process of production and
reproduction’ (2020: 68). In other words, a mode of production is about the means of production
and the relations of production; both of which constitute the economic ‘base’ of society. The
relations of production are who produces, under what conditions, and how they relate to each other
and—under capitalism—how they relate to those who don’t produce but own. A mode of
production, then, is not defined by legal or technical relations (even if it’s partially maintained
through them) and is instead a the unity of both the means and relations of production but—and
this is an important but—‘under the dominance of the relations of production’ (69).
For Marx, the capitalist mode of production became dominant once it passed from formal
subjection to real subjection. Capital at first merely takes the labor processes of handicraft and
manufacture at it finds them (in England) and takes command over it by, for example, lengthening
the working day. At this point capital has not yet acquired the direct control of the labour-process’
(1967: 478) because the regulating mechanism of production is the worker and, as such, the worker
‘maintains some autonomy from capital’ (Malott 2019: 376). Real subjection, Marx says, takes
place when ‘industries that have been taken over’ by capital ‘continue to be revolutionised by
changes in the methods of production’ (1867/1967: 478). Real subjection takes place when capital
replaces living labor as the motor of production with dead labor, or machinery. As a result, capital’s
command over labor increases and intensifies, as the knowledge of the production process is
objectified in machinery and technology and withheld from our class through the state’s repressive
apparatuses. Here, we see the two definitions of the mode of production in their unity: the means
of production and the relations of production define capitalism, which comes into its own through
real subjection.
Machinery, once it fully replaces the workers’ tools, transforms the worker ‘into a fragment
of a man’, and ‘degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine’ (604). Thus, not only the
relations of production are changed but so too is the subjectivity of workers. At the same time,
however, the figure of the collective worker is solidified. Guido Starosta goes so far as to claim
that ‘large-scale industry begets, as its most genuine product, a universal worker, that is, a
productive subject capable of taking part in any form of the human labour-process’ (2013: 239).

There is, as such, a contradictory process of subjectivation happening in which workers are both
atomized and subjected to machinery while at the same time uniting to form a class. Our class is,
in turn, constantly decomposed and recomposed through the absolute general law of capitalism,
the result of which is a dynamic and ever-expanding industrial reserve army produced through
technological developments.2
Just as the postdigital is a dialectical sublation, so too is the industrial factory, which is
especially apparent given that it is precisely the proletarian’s skills and knowledges that are
objectified in machinery. At this point, however, we should define the proletarian as anyone
subjected to capital, whether they’re employed or not, whether they do or don’t receive a wage,
whatever they produce, and wherever they are. While at one point in Capital Marx defines the
‘productive worker’ as one directly engaged in producing surplus-value—and says it’s a
‘misfortune’ (1867/1967: 477), he later writes that ‘the maintenance and reproduction of the
working-class is, and must ever be, a necessary condition to the reproduction of capital’ (537).
Surplus value isn’t just produced but has to be transported, exchanged, and realized or consumed.
Proletarian is both an adjective and a verb, it’s a process: the proletarianization of increasing
numbers of people and communities, states, and nations, is precisely the process of capitalist
production.
Wherever one falls in the ongoing process of proletarianization, the unemployed worker—
whether they’re looking for work or not, engaged in black or grey market work or formally
employed, imprisoned or ‘free’, precarious or as regularly employed as one can be under
capitalism—is part of this class from which capital expropriates land, subjectivity, knowledges,
and skills.3 One of the most interesting and potent examples is the cotton gin, an invention credited
to Eli Whitney, something of a folk hero in the U.S. elementary school curriculum. Sam Marcy,
however, argues that ‘the first gin made in Mississippi was constructed based on a crude drawing
by a skilled slave … Since the slaves were never recognized in law as persons, the slave owners
could appropriate their property as well as any inventions they might conceive of’ (2009: 59). The
impetus for the invention was the increased demand for cotton in England as a result of the
industrial revolution. Here we see capitalism changing—worsening, in fact—the barbarism of
slavery and worsening the English proletariat as well. Even under capitalism, in which the
‘individual’ enters into a ‘contract’ with a capitalist as free equals in capitalist-juridical terms, their
knowledges are the main ingredients or blueprints for ‘capital’s’ technological transformations.
Here we see a rich dialectic unfold devoid of any traces of technological determinism. In
his latest book, Andy Merrifield extrapolates on the fourth footnote in the chapter on machinery
and modern industry in Capital, where Marx articulates his dialectical and historical-materialist
approach to technology. ‘Humans make machines’, he says, ‘develop technology from bright
ideas’, which, in turn,
emerge out of prevailing material circumstances. Yet as soon as those bright ideas are
realized materially, get embodied in new technology, in new machinery, they react, help
shape us in dramatically ambivalent ways. We make technology; technology remakes us.
Technology changes prevailing ideas, too, which then open further possibilities for the
This is distinguished from the ‘absolute law’ of capitalist accumulation, which is the production of surplus value
(Marx 1867/1967: 580). Further, it is ‘like all other laws… modified in its working by many circumstances’ (603,
emphasis added).
3
It’s worth emphasizing that Marx noted that workers’ lives are made ‘the more precarious’ as a result of
proletarianization, so the figure of the ‘precariat’ is nothing new (1867/1967: 603)!
2

development of other new ideas and add other new technological advancements. (2020:
63)
The questions, of course, are whether and on what grounds these are technological advancements
or merely technological changes. Yet the point stands: ideas, social relations, the mode of
production, and the means of production exist in a dialectical relationship, with each impacting the
others.
The Social Brain in Living Labor and Fixed Capital
Even though proletarians produce the knowledge and innovations that make technological changes
possible, we don’t recognize them as such. As Marx wrote in the Grundrisse, ‘in machinery,
objectified labour confronts living labour within the labour process itself as the power which rules
it; a power which, as the appropriation of living labour, is the form of capital’ (1939/1993: 693).
The general intellect is, for Marx, precisely such a process of real subjection through the
objectification of knowledge in technology. The general intellect—which Marx introduces in the
Grundrisse notebooks—is ‘the accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive
forces of the social brain’ which are ‘absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears
as an attribute of capital’ (694). This is from a section of the Grundrisse notebooks—which were
posthumously published—and labeled the ‘Fragment on Machines’.
The notebooks were written in the 1850s as Marx studied political economy and was
published in 1939 and translated into other languages in the 1950s-60s. But of the whole set of
notes, the 10 or so pages of the Fragment that span the sixth and seventh notebooks of the
Grundrisse, helped reinvigorate Marxism in the knowledge society. This is especially true in the
Italian marxist tradition, which found in the Grundrisse notebooks a Marx that could speak back
to and against what they saw as dogmatic and rigid interpretations of scientific marxism, in part
because the notebooks were incomplete and thus non-totalizing or systematic.
The timing was right, too, as their translation into Italian happened in 1964 a year after the
founding of a pivotal autonomous journal and as a new wave of worker struggles emerged that
helped spur new crises and reconfigurations of capital, or the contemporary post-Fordist economy.
Nonetheless, it was really in the 1980s-90s, after these struggles had subsided and capital had
reached a new kind of stable arrangement (which brought about different crises), that it gained its
explanatory power (Pasquinelli 2019). Today the Fragment, especially the concept of the general
intellect that appears in it, remains a main ingredient in a range of not just marxist but leftist and
other critical approaches to the postdigital world.
In the Fragment, Marx concentrates on some of the contradictory aspects of the ongoing
development and dispersion of machinery, especially as they relate to what he called the organic
composition of capital. Capital, for Marx, was not just an economic system but a dynamic social
and political one as well. As such, he had different ways of looking at how capital was composed,
like those introduced at the beginning of chapter 25 of volume 1. One is the technical composition
of capital, which is the ratio between the number of workers employed and the number of means
of production (machines, raw materials, etc.) they work on. Another is the value composition of
capital, which is the ratio of the value of labor-power and the value of the means of production.
The first is quantitative and the latter is qualitative. There’s a relationship between the two, and
the organic composition of capital names this relationship as changes in the second are brought
about by changes in the former. In other words, if the number of machines increases while the

number of workers decreases because the machinery is more productive, this will cause the value
composition of capital to change, as there will be less labor power employed and more means of
production used.
As capital develops, he wrote, ‘the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour
time… but depends rather on the general state of science and the progress of technology, or the
application of this science to production’ (704-705). Technological transformations tell us ‘to what
degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree,
hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general
intellect and been transformed in accordance with it’ (706). This presents or intensifies two
contradictory tendencies inherent in capitalism. The first is the ‘falling rate of profit’. As profit is
the ratio of surplus-value divided by variable capital (wages) and constant capital (including
machinery), as investments in machinery (as the congealed general intellect) grows, the rate of
profit falls (because machines don’t produce value but merely transfer their existing value). Marx
takes this up later in the third volume of Capital. The second contradiction, which is related to the
first, has to do with the source and measurement of value. Rather than surplus labor-power driving
production, it is the appropriation of the general intellect, ‘the development of the social individual
which appears as the great foundations-stone of production and of wealth’ (705). Thus, the general
intellect—congealed in machinery—he writes (again, in notebooks not intended for publication)
provide ‘the material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high’ (706).
Marx hints that as the general intellect develops it produces a new material foundation for
society, one that could potentially set labor free. Of course, material conditions are not guarantees,
and capitalism for Marx can’t abolish itself through its own contradictions; only the class struggle
can do that—partially by analyzing and using these contradictions for its own purposes. As George
Caffentzis helpfully shows, both the tendency for the rate of profit to fall and the
‘incommensurability’ tendency in the Fragment—whereby labor-time is incommensurable with
value or wealth production—work together insofar as machinery raises the organic composition
of capital in one industry then other capitals move into new industries. For example, this is an
interpretation of post-Fordism recognizing new forms of labor ‘as a new source of accumulation,’
particularly the service industries, which ‘began to develop in the 1970s and 1980s that soon
became important branches of industry’ (Caffentzis 2013: 279). Another example is the absorption
of social reproduction into the realm of capital (278).
For his part, Carlo Vercellone sees the growing importance of the general intellect as a
shift away from real subjection back to formal subjection. The general intellect is about machinery
and labor-power because it is the latter that produces surplus-value and that creates technology.
Thus, the Fragment is an argument for ‘the recomposition of science and of the collective worker’
and the general intellect ‘refers to a preliminary transformation of the intellectual quality of living
labour, or to the education of a diffuse intellectuality’ (2007: 29). If the general intellect can be
really subjected to capital, he suggests, then it might ‘create certain conditions favourable to a
collective reappropriation of konwledges insofar as living labour is able to reconvert part of its
surplus labour into free time’ (28).
At this point, it’s necessary to define what exactly machinery is in the world of capital,
because we can then see why this debate about the general intellect and its location and relations
is so important. In the second volume of Capital Marx categorizes machinery as fixed capital,
which is distinct from circulating capital. Both are forms of capital in the production process.
Circulating capital literally circulates along with the commodity. For example, the cotton used to
produce a t-shirt enters the t-shirt and circulates with it. At the same time, however,

another part remains fixed in the means of labour and hence in the production process. The
value fixed in this way steadily declines, until the means of labour is worn out and has
therefore distributed its value, in a longer or shorter period, over the volume of products
that has emerged from a series of continually repeated labour processes. (Marx 1885/1978:
237-238)
While much fuss is made today about the mobility of capital–which can certainly move about the
globe like never before—this tendency toward mobility exists alongside a contradictory tendency
toward immobility. Take, for example, the revolutions in transportation and communication that
Marx wrote about. These arise to overcome the barriers capital encounters as it expands throughout
space and time. Capitalism constantly works to produce a set of spatial relations that enables
production and circulation to happen as quickly as possible. Selling time is particularly important
in this regard. This is why Malott proposes that capitalist crises in the postdigital era tend to
manifest as crises of realization (2019: 373).
A permanently effective cause of differentiation in selling time, and hence in turnover time
in general, is the distance of the market where the commodities are sold from their place of
production’ (1885/1978: 327). This is another motivating force behind capital’s drive to annihilate
space by time, and developments in transportation are fundamental to this: With the development
of means of transport, the speed of movement in space is accelerated, and spatial distance is thus
shortened in time’ (327). In turn, means of communication develop ‘so that for instance many
ships depart for the same ports at the same time, several trains run between the same two points
along different railways’ (327). Developments in communication help coordinate advances in
transportation.
There are two contradictory implications that arise from these concurrent developments.
The first implication is that the overall mass of commodities circulating through space and time
increases and, as a result, there is a greater outlay of capital that is locked in commodity form. The
second implication is that there is a greater outlay of capital invested in transportation and
communication. These are contradictory developments because, while advances in transportation
and communication are intended to—and, in many ways, do—help facilitate the realization of
value, by increasing the outlay of capital the risk of crisis is heightened and intensified (the risk of
crisis by devaluation, for example).
Fixed capital is not an accidental but a necessary form of capital; it comes about as a direct
consequence of capital’s logic (see Ford 2017). Like all elements of capitalism, fixed capital is
quite a contradiction in that it is, well, fixed, while capital is all about motion and fluidity—the
expansion and movement of value. Fixed capital is resolutely necessary for capital, however:
‘Fixed capital is as much a presupposition for the production of circulating capital as circulating
capital is for the production of fixed capital’ (1939/1993: 734). Don Mitchell makes the
significance of this antagonistic necessity explicit: ‘For capital to be free’, he writes, ‘it must also
be fixed in place’ and this represents ‘the central geographic contradiction of capitalism’ (2003:
165). One way that capital attempts to deal with this contradiction is, not surprisingly, through
ideology. Through touting itself as infinitely mobile and able to leap across the globe at the drop
of a dime, capital can dictate a range of local policies and practices.
Postdigital Communism and Pedagogy: Beyond Measure?

The extent to which the general intellect is the driving motor of production and knowledge is
central to economics, politics, and the world generally, poses a number of problems for capital.
Therefore, a number of possibilities for resistance; namely that knowledge in non-rivalrous, nonexclusive, and doesn’t operate according to the logic of scarcity. For one, knowledge doesn’t
always or readily take the form of a commodity over which one can claim private ownership. It’s
easier to claim a plot of land, a building, a set of machines, or a batch of raw materials than it is to
claim knowledge. As a result, the status of knowledge as a public or private good is hard to ascribe.
Knowledge doesn’t obey the same laws of scarcity or rivalry as physical commodities. One
person’s knowledge doesn’t eliminate the possibility of another person’s knowledge except
through capitalist enclosure and expropriation. When one person utilize knowledge it’s not as if
the knowledge is diminished for of inaccessible to another. Moreover, the more people access
knowledge the more knowledge can be created. Finally, because it’s hard to draw boundaries
around knowledge and designate it as a commodity, it’s also difficult to prevent people from
accessing knowledge. Everyone on the political spectrum, from the neoliberals to the marxists,
acknowledge this.
For the neoliberals, it’s a problem to be solved. You can’t totally privatize knowledge, but
it can’t be totally public, either. What really matters are decreased government regulations (which
are paradoxically facilitated by the state), the availability of venture capital to entrepreneurs and
small to medium businesses (they still really like microfinancing, too), reduced trade barriers,
investments in infrastructure, establishing networks between universities, government, and the
private sector to facilitate research and development, and investment in an education system
comprising primary, secondary, tertiary, vocational, and lifelong learning. By showing interactions
over time and between nation-states, the World Bank Institute thinks their Knowledge Economy
Index will let them determine the right mixture of policies and investments.4 The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (2018: 4) is even pursuing the measurement ‘of social
and emotional skills’ because ‘in an increasingly fast-changing and diverse world’, they say, ‘the
role of social and emotional skills is becoming more important. A faster pace of living and a shift
to urban environments means people need to engage with new ways of thinking and working and
new people’. They define these skills as those that enable one to ‘regulate one’s thoughts, emotions
and behaviour’ in response to our ‘fast-changing and diverse world’, ‘the dismantling of traditional
social networks’, and ‘a shift to urban environments’ (4). In sum, they’re oriented around adapting
the casualties of the absolute general law of capitalist production to the absolute general law of
capitalist production.
For marxists, the immeasurability of the general intellect is precisely its promise. Capital’s
ability to control the knowledge economy, according to this view, weakened. ‘Within economic
production’, Hardt and Negri write, ‘knowledge is no longer merely a means to the creation of
value (in the commodity form), but rather the production of knowledge is itself value creation’. As
a result, ‘capital is in fact confronted with a paradoxical situation: the more it is forced to pursue
valorization through knowledge production, the more than knowledge escapes its control’ (Hardt
and Negri 2009: 268). The collective, non-rivalrous, easily duplicated, and immaterial nature of
4

The methodology takes a wide view of the knowledge economy, which is organized around four pillars that
include ‘an educated and skilled labor force, a dense and modern information infrastructure, an effective innovation
system, and an institutional regime that offers incentives for the efficient creation, dissemination, and use of existing
knowledge’ (The World Bank Institute 2007: 23). https://datasource.kapsarc.org/explore/dataset/knowledgeeconomy-index-world-bank2012/information/?disjunctive.location_name&disjunctive.indicator_name&disjunctive.measure_name.

knowledge—as well as the collaboration and openness required for knowledge production—
makes it unwieldy for capital. As a result, capital tends to rely on enclosing and expropriating the
common social brain. It’s important to note that capital continues to enclose and expropriate laborpower, raw materials, and means of production as well through imperialist wars. Yet relative to
the postdigital general intellect, it takes the form of intellectual property rights and patents, as well
as through financial mechanisms like derivatives, which are bets on the future productivity of the
general intellect, and rent (Ford and Sasaki 2020).
The immeasurability of knowledge is under attack by capital’s enclosures, and we must
embrace it and defend it to create a new society. Rather than take state power, we have to withdraw
from capital and its rent-seeking financial mechanisms to create new spaces and forms of life. For
Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, the answer is poetry. Poetry exceeds economic exchange; ‘poetry is the
language of nonexchangeability, the return of infinite hermeneutics, and the return of the sensuous
body of language… I’m talking about poetry here as an excess of language, a hidden resource
which enables us to shift from one paradigm to another’ (2012: 140). Today, communication is
abstracted through digital finance. ‘Language’, by contrast, ‘is boundless: its potentiality is not
limited by the limits of the signified. Poetry is the excess of language.’ (2018: 32) Berardi’s quest
is similar to Paolo Virno’s, who makes a shift from the general to the generic intellect (Ford
2020a). What capital mobilizes is not this or that actualized knowledge but rather our infinite
potentiality of knowledge, which is most evident in language. The task is to wield it against capital,
which can only be done by delinking the general intellect from wage labor through ‘cooperation
in excess of the Intellect’ (Virno 2004: 67). Withdrawal, or defection from the state and capital,
takes place through ‘a dramatic, autonomous, and affirmative expression of this surplus’ (71).
Some contemporary marxist theorists believe that the predominance of the general intellect
undercuts Marx’s theory of value, precisely because you can’t measure the labor-time for the
production of communication, affects, language, knowledge, and so on. Yet Marx’s law of value
is precisely immeasurable. For Marx, value is socially-necessary labor time, which he called so
because 1) it is the overall average time it takes to produce a commodity (e.g., if it takes me two
days to produce the same commodity that you produce in one day, my commodity isn’t twice as
valuable and instead, if we are the only producers, the socially-necessary labor time for our
commodity would be exactly in the middle at 1.5 days); and 2) it fulfills a need or desire of society
at the time (if I produce a commodity that no one wants, the labor embodied in it has no value
because there is no use value; it’s literally a non-value). Both aspects of value are dynamic; they
change over time and in ways that are often unpredictable and hard to pinpoint at the moment. In
fact, the utility of anything is qualitative and singular, so it escapes not only measure but even the
consciousness of the consumer (don’t we all wonder why we get enjoyment out of certain things—
television shows, singers, etc.?).
The real question is not about measure. Instead, as Malott formulates it properly, it is ‘how
to sublate ourselves, and the world in the process, into a world of non-alienated cyborgs, free of
exploitation, building a still opaque communist future’ (2019: 372). Hardt and Negri helpfully
remind us that there is a ‘mistake in posing an ontological division and even opposition between
human life and machines. Human thought and action have always been interwoven with techniques
and technologies.’ (2017: 109) The division between fixed capital and living labor is a class
division, not an ontological one, and should be treated as a political struggle as Malott asserts. The
division between the digital and the analogue is historical and political. The immeasurable is a
weapon in the class struggle, one that is up for grabs by the two classes engaged in struggle.

Postdigital Capitalism or Postdigital Communism
In the edition of Capital referenced earlier, the index entry for ‘mode of production’ points you to
‘socio-economic formation’. My speculation is that they wanted first to underscore that any mode
of production is not just economic but social, but moreover to emphasize—as Marx did—that
every socio-economic formation consisted of multiple modes of production. In the preface to the
first German edition of Capital, for example, Marx justified his focus on England on the basis that
it was where the capitalist mode of production was most developed but noted that ‘alongside of
modern evils’ of capitalism, ‘a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive
survival of antiquated modes of production’ (1867/1967: 20). In fact, the very first sentence of the
book contains a key qualifier that’s often glossed over. ‘The wealth of those societies,’ Marx
writes, ‘in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense
accumulation of commodities”’ (43, emphasis added). While it’s often noted that wealth isn’t
commodities but only appears as such, what is less remarked is that the capitalist mode of
production only prevails; it isn’t exclusive. It should be added that Marx also uses socio-economic
formation or social formation rather than society because the latter he sees as arising specifically
with capitalism.
Interestingly, neither Marx nor Lenin ever write about a socialist mode of production.
Instead, Lenin defines socialism ‘as the transition between the capitalist mode of production and
the communist mode of production’ (Althusser 2020: 63). Social formations take various forms
and are composed of different modes of production, some or one of which is ascendant or
dominant. As a social formation, socialism is the heterogeneity of elements of both modes of
production in which communist relations and means of production are ascending through the class
struggle. Marx identifies several elements of the communist mode of production in capitalism,
from joint-stock companies to the general intellect. ‘They are’, Althusser insists, ‘not all
communist elements. They are elements for communism.’ (65) In the same way, peer
collaboration, the general intellect, collaboration, collective projects, and so on, are also elements
for communism. Right now, however, they’re captured by capitalism which functions precisely by
valorizing the immeasurability that some on the left celebrate.
Marx in the postdigital era doesn’t pose a technical or juridical challenge, but a class
challenge: how to collectivize the proletarian class—in practice and theory—to advance the class
struggle. As capital produced the collective worker it continually had—and has—to divide us. In
the U.S., the primary mode has been division through individuation. This theme runs throughout
A history of education for the many: From colonization and slavery to the decline of US
imperialism, where Malott (2021) demonstrates that the common school movement’s leaders like
Horace Mann argued that common schools would ‘reorient how workers understand how to
improve their conditions. The objective was to replace the view that better working conditions and
a better life are achieved through unions and collective struggle with an individualist orientation.
(Malott 2021: 90) Most interestingly, Malott shows how this orientation informed critical
pedagogy, a term Henry Giroux coined in the early 1980s that foregrounds ‘agency in the
classroom’ and works ‘at the individual level of micro-politics. Critical pedagogy’s most common
active subject of change is the individual critically conscious teacher acting for the many rather
than with the many’ (188).
To move to the many, we move beyond the individual subject. In the Grundrisse Marx
‘defines capitalism as a social system in which human beings are ruled by abstractions, first and
foremost’ (Toscano 2014: 1225). The individual is one such abstraction, and he dedicates the 1857

Introduction of the Grundrisse to showing that the production of the subject as an individual was
a historical product, one that emerged in the 18th century and one that, as such, was far from natural
or transcendental. In fact, this was his critique of so many bourgeois political economists of his
day (as well as Proudhon). For them, the eighteenth-century individual, he writes, appears as an
ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historical result but as history’s point of
departure’ (Marx 1939/1993: 83). That the individual is the subject of production is as much of an
absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each
other’ (84). This, in addition to the withdrawal of state support and financial precarity and so on,
could provide another reason for why Jodi Dean claims the individual subject-form is failing today.
Interestingly, she argues that ‘the technologies that further individuation … provide at the same
time an escape from and alternative to individuation: connection to others, collectivity’ (2016: 64).
Networked technologies are communist elements in our capitalist social formation.
At the conclusion of their article on biodigital philosophy and postdigital knowledge
ecologies, Michael Peters, Petar Jandrić, and Sarah Hayes delineate ‘two major forms in the
political economy of bioeconomy—capitalist and socialist’ (2021: 383). In other words, postdigital
knowledge ecologies and their various formulations or offspring are fundamentally divided along
the lines of the mode of production. Such knowledge ecologies and their components must be
partisan, which means that they’re also philosophical; they divide. We have to properly understand
that the division is between capitalism and communism, through the transition to socialism.
Yet capitalism has changed in fundamental ways, and in educational ways, particularly
with the rise of the so-called knowledge economy (see Ford 2021). The openness, networking, and
communication so central to production today is, according to some on the left, a promise of a
more productive future in socialism. Peters puts it succinctly:
The intellectual commons provides an alternative to the currently dominant ‘knowledge
capitalism’. Whereas knowledge capitalism focuses on the economics of knowledge,
emphasizing human capital development, intellectual property regimes, and efficiency and
profit maximization, the intellectual commons, let’s call it ‘knowledge socialism’, shifts
the emphasis towards recognition that knowledge and its value are ultimately rooted in
social relations, a kind of genuine knowledge socialism that promotes the sociality of
knowledge by providing mechanisms for a truly free exchange of ideas. (2020: 6-7)
Capital requires such openness and must continually navigate it. It needs new ideas, innovations,
and so on. The excess and immeasurability of knowledge is not a locus of resistance but the motor
of capital accumulation. As Giorgio Agamben formulates it, today capitalists are effective ‘not so
much because they act on primary behaviors, but because they act on pure means, that is, on
behaviors that have been separated from themselves and thus detached from any relationship to an
end’ (Agamben 2005/2007: 87). Right now, in other words, ‘capitalism is nothing but a gigantic
apparatus for capturing pure means’ (87).
The postdigital is post because the digital can’t replace or destroy the analog. Postdigital
capitalism feeds on the surplus of the analogue. Take Phoebe Moore and Andrew Robinson’s study
of Wearable and other Self-Tracking Devices, for example. They observe that ‘a central aspect of
such technologies is the quantification of what were formerly treated as immeasurable, qualitative
aspects of the labour process or the self—such as mood, fatigue, psychological well-being, the
desirability of cultural products and the worker’s breaks and time-off. This renders workers
permanently visible to management’ (2016: 2779). In other words, they identify a link between

measurement and visibility, for only once something is measured can it be rendered transparent,
communicable. Yet only that which isn’t measured can be measured. Thus, while ‘bits and bytes
can easily be manipulated in socialist ways’, we need ‘hardware socialism’ which ‘urgently
requires new political economies and theoretical groundings (Jandrić 2020: 94, emphasis added).
A Marxist Educational Gesture for The Postdigital Class Struggle
How might marxist pedagogical theory—which is also a practice—respond to postdigital
capitalism? To proffer an answer to this question, I should first clarify that the audience for this
paper is primarily the academic interested in or active in political struggles. To that extent, what
is to be done is to wage the class struggle with the resources we have and on the global scale.
Althusser offers importantly reminds us that there is no linearity to Marxism, and that when Lenin
proposed that imperialism was the culminating stage of imperialism, he didn’t mean it would result
in socialism. In fact, the ‘evolutionist representation of Marxist theory’ is ‘yet another victory, and
a big one, of bourgeois ideology’ (2020: 121). We are still in the age of imperialism, and the task
at hand is to fight against it by waging class warfare in all arenas—including those of postdigital
science and education.
In an oft-cited definition, the postdigital is defined as ‘hard to define; messy; unpredictable;
digital and analog; technological and non-technological; biological and informational. The
postdigital is both a rupture in our existing theories and their continuation.’ (Jandrić et al. 2018:
895) The postdigital is a stupefying question or moment that demands we retune ourselves
constantly, which is the same gesture that Marx makes, even in Capital, as the book is ‘a
theoretical, systematic text, yet an unfinished … one … because it supposes a culmination … that
is other than theoretical, an outside in which theory would be “pursued by other means”’ (Althusser
2020: 144). It demands experimentation, yet a kind of experimentation that capital can’t capture
or enclose.
An example of such an experiment would be Reading Capital, the book collectively
authored by Althusser and his students. In his first contribution, Althusser begins by noting that
the book is a series of notes from a seminar course and they ‘bear the mark of these circumstances:
not only in their construction, their rhythm, their didactic or oral style, but above all in their
discrepancies, the repetitions, hesitations and uncertain steps in their investigations’ (Althusser
1965/2015: 11). They could have, he writes, tried ‘to make a finished work out of them’, but chose
instead ‘to present them for what they are: precisely, incomplete texts, the mere beginnings of a
reading’ (11). Toward the end of the contribution, Althusser notes that Marx develops concept in
two ways, synchronically and diachronically. Both are forms of presenting and producing
knowledge amount to learning, but with different scientific procedures and different knowledge
effects.
‘Synchrony’, Althusser writes, ‘represents the organizational structure of the concepts in
the thought-totality or system’, while ‘diachrony [represents] the movement succession of the
concepts in the ordered discourse of the proof’ (Althusser 1965/2015: 70). When only read or
written synchronically, concepts are presented linearly as building blocks for further concepts. Yet
diachrony is when concepts are developed through displacement as they take on different
contingencies and therefore dislocate knowledge. Each has a distinct temporality, as synchrony
proceeds through succession linearly and according to a developmental logic while diachrony is
open and aleatory, uncertain and hesitant.

We can grasp the pedagogical simultaneity of the synchronic and diachronic through two
recent theorizations of Althusser’s pedagogy, both of which build on Althusser’s notion of
interpellation. For Althusser, ideology functions concretely through interpellation, a process
through which we are ‘recruited’ into the dominant ideology.5 David Backer gives an example
from his school life: when he received his state test scores. Backer writes that his father ‘said that
if I didn’t score higher on such tests in the future, then I wouldn’t be allowed to go to summer
camp… the test interpellated me in this case: I learned what I that I had to behave in a certain way
with these tests, that around here we perform well on state tests, or else’ (2019: 6). For Althusser—
and this is really important—there is no ‘temporal succession’ of interpellation: ‘ideology has
always-already interpellated individuals as subjects’ (2014: 192). Even before we’re born, we’re
given a name, interpellated into a lineage, and so on. The ideological state apparatuses (like the
school, church, family, media, and so on) function along with the repressive state apparatuses (like
the policy, army, courts, and so on). Althusser saw the school as becoming the dominant
ideological state apparatus. Thus, the content of schooling matters less than the form of schooling.
In Backer’s case, what the test tested was of less concern than the testing process itself.
Interpellation is significant because it moves the class struggle into the realm of ideology
and theory. What happens in schools is thus central because it can determine ‘the balance of power
in the class struggle… in the number-one Ideological State Apparatus’ (2014: 159). Interpellation
is the glue that fastens the contradictory and antagonistic modes of production in any given social
formation—including their social relations—together. Glue, of course, doesn’t always hold, never
permanently seals anything, and can’t totally conquer the air. As such, interpellation doesn’t fully
succeed, and we can pedagogically facilitate such failures through multiple means, the first of
which is counterinterpellation.
Backer defines counterinterpellation as ‘a taking up and taking on those interpellations that
shift the balance of forces away from the ruling class’s control’ (2018: 11). Counterinterpellation
is a refusal of interpellation, a rejection of the hailing that positions the subject within the
reproduction of capitalist relations. Counterinterpellation acknowledges and militates against such
practices in the production of antagonistic subjectivities. Interpellations are ‘small moments with
big meanings: they are the concrete practical moments whereby social context weaves through
consciousness, connecting with and composing individual subjectivity’ (5). Yet interpellations are
never secured and are fragile, subject to the class struggle. For example, we’re interpellated into
and through language but return and utilize language ‘in undeniably unique ways’, such as through
‘poetry, innuendo, paradox, neologism, philosophy, and puns’ which ‘all happen within and
against the prefabricated linguistic structures speakers must speak’ (9). I remember someone
shouting ‘queer’ at a friend and me as we were walking down the street, and my friend responding
with a loud ‘thank you’! This was a refusal of an attempted interpellation of us into abject subjects
and a counterinterpellation that affirmed a different sense of queerness.
Tyson Lewis finds Althusser’s marxist philosophy of education in the pedagogic encounter
with alterity and, instead of counterinterpellation, proposes disinterpellation. For Lewis,
counterinterpellation is a political practice that is always oriented in a particular direction and
therefore isn’t properly educational. Lewis finds disinterpellation in Althusser’s aleatory
materialism. In Philosophy for Non-Philosophers, Althusser recounts aleatory materialism through
What might be less well known is that one of Althusser’s purposes in developing the theory of interpellation is to
agitate against anti-socialist theories or ‘“anticipatory’ works depicting “totalitarian” socialist society as a society in
which every individual will be doubled by his personal “monitor”’ (2014: 177).One can’t help but think Althusser’s
target here is the anti-communist and CIA-collaborator, George Orwell.
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Lucretius’ poem on Epicurus: ‘Before the beginning of the world’, Althusser starts, ‘the atoms
were “falling like rain”. This would have gone on indefinitely, had the atoms not been endowed
with an astonishing property, “declination”, the capacity to deviate from the straight line
(Althusser 2017: 29, emphasis in original). The atoms clashed, and enough encounters took hold
that they created a world. Here, contingency reigns over necessity and the exception is the rule.
The pedagogical encounter is ‘an exposure to an outside’ and an excess or surplus gap within
(counter)interpellative moments. As such, the pedagogical encounter can’t ‘be brought about by
learning theory or the expertise of the teacher’, and ‘rather happen when a certain configuration of
institutional and extrainstitutional forces come into play’ (Lewis 2017: 314). The educational space
this happens is the seminar, which allows for ‘a moment of disinterpellation through which
students, materials (books, essays, films, and so forth), and the teacher enter into a constellation
of forces that destabilize and thus open up a space and a time wherein a new kind of educational
life beyond the subject temporarily forms’ (316).
One problem Backer identifies with disinterpellation is that ‘it assumes a moment beyond
ideology but really is predicated on ‘an ideology with certain features, namely that of a communist
horizon’ (2018:16). As a result, there is still an unacknowledged political project and orientation
at play. For Backer, the marxist teacher works to produce counterinterpellation through ‘knowing
what kinds of social forces act on and through one’s classroom’ and helping ‘students learn how
to make interventions that shift the social formation’s balance of forces’ (19). For Lewis, on the
other hand, counterinterpellation is a political necessity but one that doesn’t allow for the
educational experience of making ‘the subject unfamiliar to itself and thus open to its own
dissolution through the encounter with an outside’ (2017: 314). The marxist teacher can’t make
such an experience happen but can only try to ‘open a space for an encounter by setting up the
possibilities for a clash’ and holding onto such clashes (314).6 Counterinterpellation necessitates
the teacher’s knowledge, while disinterpellation necessitates the subject’s openness to nonknowledge.
I propose that the pedagogical interplay of synchrony and diachrony allows for the play of
both disinterpellation and counterinterpellation. It is not that the teacher doesn’t have a politics—
as if that was possible—or that capitalist forces like debt cease operating on the student’s
subjectivity. On the contrary, the student who suffers the aleatory swerve is in a state of deferral
while disinterpellated. The void, after all, is still composed of matter as ‘something cannot come
from nothing’ (Goshgarian 2019: 245). This deferral is a decomposition of individual capitalist
subjectivity, a feeling that the collectivization of the proletarian class is realizable. On the other
hand, counterinterpellation is the political experience of intervening to produce that collective and
advance the class struggle. Counterinterpellation is a synchronic movement that shifts the balance
of forces by asserting a revolutionary knowledge and subject position against capitalism, while
disinterpellation is a diachronic movement that reveals the limitations of revolutionary knowledge
and subjectivity under capitalism. In neither case do we renounce, as Althusser puts it, ‘that it is
possible to organize the workers’ class struggle for the seizure of power and for socialism’ (2020:
155). The pedagogical mode is one in which the synchronic and diachronic dialectically intertwine
as—and with—the digital and analogue.
The pedagogical force of their simultaneity is that of a rupture in the world as it is: both
knowledge and non-knowledge, information and ignorance, a step forward and sideways. One
reads the book and understands learns the content while remaining stupefied in the face of its
potential meaning. Counterinterpellations on their own can potentially produce new knowledge
6

These aren’t the only elements at play in the Backer-Lewis debate.

commons for capital to expropriate, or they can produce disinterpellative experiences in that the
refusal of the insult of interpellation opens a space for the encounter with another possible world
and set of social relations that we can’t know in the present but can only feel.
The pedagogical directive is to inhabit this heterogeneity in the face of capital’s allpowerful forces of abstraction. We experience a collectivity but, more pointedly, a collectivity that
remains mute and infantile and antagonistic and public. The political project is, then, to force these
encounters to cohere so that we can build communism, sublating the relationship between what is
now antagonistically divided between fixed capital and living labor into a liberated, collective,
ecological subject. Consider, by way of conclusion, digital technologies that mediate the voice
through automatic tuning, filters, and other means. Such mediations reveal that vocalization is a
‘process without a subject’ insofar as they prevent us from linking the sound of a voice to an
essence of an individual subject or a piece of fixed capital. They produce another sonic surplus
that capital might capture if we only listen synchronically for new and meanings and knowledges
or that workers might utilize for oppositional counterinterpellations. But if we listen diachronically
as well, we receive an immersive education in the wonder as well as the theory of class struggle,
a struggle that is advanced ideologically and materially through the forces of opposition and
swerve.
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